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ALD-123        NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 16-4013 
___________ 
 
MARTIN E. FOUNTAIN, 
     Appellant 
 
v. 
 
WARDEN JAMES T. VAUGHN CORRECTIONAL CENTER;  
JAMES T. VAUGHN CORRECTIONAL CENTER 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of Delaware 
(D.C. Civil No. 1-15-cv-00526) 
District Judge:  Honorable Leonard P. Stark 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) or  
Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
February 2, 2017 
Before:  MCKEE, JORDAN, and RESTREPO, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: February 17, 2017 ) 
___________ 
 
OPINION* 
___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Martin E. Fountain, an inmate at the James T. Vaughn Correctional Center in 
Smyrna, Delaware, appeals from an order of the United States District Court for the 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
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District of Delaware denying a motion for reconsideration of an order dismissing his 
action as legally frivolous.  We will summarily affirm. 
 While Fountain was at his prison job in May 2015, he was told to return to his 
building.  Once there, Fountain was transferred to the MHU (i.e., Medium-High Housing 
Unit), losing his job in the process.  Five days later, an emergency administrative 
classification hearing was held, and Fountain was reclassified to the SHU (i.e., Security 
Housing Unit).  As of the date Fountain initiated this action, he had not been served with 
any disciplinary action paperwork or advised of the results of any investigation.  Fountain 
alleges that he was transferred from minimum security without notice and without being 
charged with disciplinary misconduct in violation of his right to due process.  Fountain 
seeks a return to minimum security housing and back pay, among other forms of relief.  
Fountain filed a “Motion for Injunction,” which the District Court liberally construed as a 
Complaint.  Upon review of the Complaint, the District Court dismissed the action as 
frivolous under 28 U.S.C § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) and ruled that amendment would be futile.  
Six months later, Fountain filed a motion for reconsideration under Rule 59(e), which 
was denied by the District Court.  This appeal followed. 
 We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  Because the motion for 
reconsideration and notice of appeal were not filed within the time limits set forth in 
Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4, this Court does not have jurisdiction to review the 
                                                                                                                                                  
constitute binding precedent. 
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District Court’s original order of dismissal.1  Our review is therefore limited to the 
District Court’s order on the Rule 59(e) motion for reconsideration.  The appropriate 
standard of review is for an abuse of discretion.  See Fed. Kemper Ins. Co. v. Rauscher, 
807 F.2d 345, 348 (3d Cir. 1986).  We may summarily affirm the District Court’s order if 
there is no substantial question presented by the appeal.  See Third Cir. LAR 27.4 and 
I.O.P. 10.6.   
This appeal presents no substantial question.  The purpose of a motion for 
reconsideration is “to correct manifest errors of law or fact or to present newly 
discovered evidence.”  Max’s Seafood Café v. Quinteros, 176 F.3d 669, 677 (3d Cir. 
1999).  A proper Rule 59(e) motion therefore must rely on one of three grounds: (1) 
an intervening change in controlling law; (2) the availability of new evidence; or (3) 
the need to correct clear error of law or prevent manifest injustice.  N. River Ins. Co. 
v. CIGNA Reinsurance Co., 52 F.3d 1194, 1218 (3d Cir. 1995).  Fountain’s brief 
motion for reconsideration primarily advanced the same arguments that were in his 
                                              
1 For civil matters, aside from certain exceptions not applicable here, the notice of appeal 
must be filed within thirty days of the entry of judgment.  Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(A).  
The time to file the notice of appeal is tolled when a timely Rule 59(e) motion is filed in 
the district court within 28 days after the entry of judgment.  Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e); Fed. 
R. App. P. 4(a)(4)(A)(iv).  But “an untimely Rule 59(e) motion, even one that was not 
objected to in the district court, does not toll the time to file a notice of appeal under Rule 
4(a)(4)(A).”  Lizardo v. United States, 619 F.3d 273, 280 (3d Cir. 2010).  Because 
Fountain’s untimely Rule 59(e) motion did not toll the time to file a notice of appeal, his 
notice of appeal was untimely as to the District Court’s original order of dismissal and 
timely only as to the order on the motion for reconsideration. 
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Complaint.  Because this is not a proper basis for reconsideration, the District Court 
appropriately denied the motion on these grounds.   
In addition, the motion for reconsideration contended that the Complaint, and 
Fountain’s arguments, should have been more liberally construed to allow Fountain’s 
action to proceed.  We interpret this as a request to correct a manifest injustice.  We 
do not find, however, any manifest injustice.  Indeed, we concur with the District 
Court that the Complaint “lacked an arguable basis either in law or in fact,” Neitzke v. 
Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989), and was “based on an indisputably meritless 
legal theory.”  Id. at 327-28.   
Fountain’s claim related to his administrative classification level is indisputably 
meritless.  To succeed on a due process claim, Fountain must first demonstrate that he 
was deprived of a liberty interest.  Fraise v. Terhune, 283 F.3d 506, 522 (3d Cir. 
2002).  The Due Process Clause does not subject an inmate’s treatment by prison 
authorities to judicial oversight as long as the degree of confinement or conditions to 
which the inmate is subjected are within the sentence imposed and do not otherwise 
violate the Constitution.  Id. (citing Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 468 (1983)).  
Because segregation at a different administrative security level is the sort of 
confinement that Fountain should reasonably anticipate receiving at some point in his 
incarceration, his transfer to less amenable and more restrictive custody does not 
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implicate a liberty interest that arises under the Due Process Clause.  Torres v. Fauver, 
292 F.3d 141, 150 (3d Cir. 2002).  
Nor does Delaware state law create liberty interests that are protected by the 
Due Process Clause and implicated here.  See Carrigan v. Delaware, 957 F. Supp. 
1376, 1385 (D. Del. 1997) (“Repeatedly, this [c]ourt has determined that the State of 
Delaware has created no constitutionally protected interest in a prisoner’s 
classification.”); 11 Del. C. § 6529(e) (giving the Department of Corrections power to 
maintain “any” system of classification at its institutions).  Furthermore, in Griffin v. 
Vaughn, 112 F.3d 703, 708 (3d Cir. 1997), we held that administrative custody for a 
period as long as fifteen months is not an atypical and significant hardship.  At the 
time that he filed his complaint, Fountain had been in a segregated population for less 
than one month.  Accordingly, Fountain’s administrative placement is not an atypical 
or a significant hardship that would deprive him of a state-created liberty interest.  Id.; 
Sandin v. Connor, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995). 
 Similarly, Fountain’s claim related to his loss of prison employment is not 
cognizable under the Due Process Clause.  Put simply, restriction from employment 
and prison programs are among the conditions of confinement that Fountain should 
reasonably anticipate during his incarceration.  See James v. Quinlan, 866 F.2d 627, 
629 (3d Cir. 1989); Torres, 292 F.3d at 150.2 
                                              
2 Fountain’s employment-related claim fares no better under the Eighth Amendment.  
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Accordingly, the District Court did not abuse its discretion in denying 
Fountain’s motion for reconsideration on the grounds of manifest injustice.  We will 
summarily affirm. 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                  
“It is clear that a prisoner’s claim under the Eighth Amendment must establish more 
egregious conduct than that adequate to support a tort at common law.”  Williams v. 
Mussomelli, 722 F.2d 1130, 1133 (3d Cir. 1983).  The loss of employment privileges 
asserted by Fountain is clearly insufficient to rise to this level.  See Inmates of 
Occoquan v. Barry, 844 F.2d 828, 836 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (“[C]ertain sorts of 
‘deprivations,’ such as limited work and educational opportunities, do not even fall 
within the broad compass of ‘punishments’ within the meaning of the Constitution.”). 
